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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooooOoooo 
Appellant's Brief 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appe11ee, 
V. : 
ELROY BARLOW, : Ct. App. No. 920381-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
- ooooOoooo 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court pursuant to Rule 
26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d)(Supp. 1991), whereby the defendant in a circuit 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the court of appeals 
from a final order on a misdemeanor offense. In this case the 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and 
conviction for the offense of criminal non-support in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-7-201 (1990). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions are 
attached as addendum A: 
United States Constitution amend. V : 
United States Constitution amend. VI 
United States Constitution amend. XIV 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-7-201 (1990) J 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. DID THE STATE FAIL TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTION? 
II. WERE THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO A PRIVATE PRE-
TRIAL MEETING WITH MR. BARLOW AND HIS REVELATION ABOUT DISCUSSIONS 
IN THAT MEETING AND HIS REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE IMPROPER? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a conviction on sufficiency of the evidence, 
the court should review the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). An 
appellate court will "reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." Id. 659 P. 2d at 444. An 
appellant is also required to marshal 1 all the evidence in support 
of the verdict and then demonstrate how when viewing the evidence 
most favorable to verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support 
that finding. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) . 
An appellate court will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial 
misconduct if an appellate can show that 
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the 
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in 
considering in determining its verdict and, if so, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result . . . . 
2 
State v. Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 49 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(quoting State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct App. 1990)). 
Because the trial court is in a better position to determine the 
impact of the improper statement on the proceedings, the trial 
court's ruling will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On September 25, 1991, the State of Utah charged Mr. 
Barlow with the offense of criminal non-support in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1990). Prior to trial, the court 
granted Mr. Barlow's motion in limine to suppress evidence of pre-
information child support arrearages. The court again ruled at 
trial that evidence of any pre-trial arrearages was inadmissible. 
The case proceeded to trial on March 3, 1992. Mr. Barlow 
stipulated that he was divorced from his ex-wife, Kathleen Barlow, 
that he owed child support payments of $300 per month, and that he 
made partial child support payments during the nine month charging 
period. The state presented no evidence of Mr. Barlow's ability to 
work or any evidence of his ability to earn an income. 
The state must show that Mr. Barlow intentionally and without 
just cause failed to pay child support. The state neither 
investigated Mr. Barlow's ability to pay nor presented evidence 
demonstrating that he had the ability to pay; therefore, the state 
failed to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah 
1992). The prosecutor also committed reversible misconduct by 
disclosing pre-trial comments made by Mr. Barlow during a private 
meeting in Mr. Hunt's office. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 25, 1991, Mr. Barlow was charged with the 
crime of criminal non-support in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
4 
7-201 (1990). (A copy of the Information is attached hereto as 
addendum "B"). Mr. Barlow was charged with failing to pay child 
support obligations for an eight month period from January to 
August, 1991. See Trial Record, 1-3, (hereinafter H R H ) . 
2. Mr. Barlow filed a pre-trial motion in limine to suppress 
evidence of prior convictions and prior bad acts. R. 31-33. At 
the motion hearing held on February 26, 1992, the court ruled that 
it "would probably not let . . . in [evidence of prior non-support 
payments and arrearages] in the case in chief, but would allow that 
in for rebuttal purposes if Mr. Barlow takes the stand and 
testifies to certain facts." Motion Transcript (2/26/92), 2. 
(hereinafter MTR). The court, at a second pre-trial hearing on 
February 28, 1992, ruled that the State could not introduce 
evidence of Mr. Barlow's prior arrearages as long as Mr. Barlow did 
not testify about prior periods where he made timely payments. 
Trial Transcript (2/28/92), 5. (hereinafter TR.(2/28/92)) . Despite 
the court's rulings the prosecutor attempted to introduce evidence 
of "Mr.Bar low's past history of not paying . . . from about 1984 to 
1987, where he didn't make adequate payments." TR. 162 (3/2/92), 
TR. 131 (3/2/92). The court reiterated its prior ruling in holding 
that prior evidence of nonpayment "was too prejudicial [under Utal 
Rules of Evidence 403 and 404], that it was (sic) nothing to sho1 
that it was an ongoing scheme of (sic) behalf of Mr. Barlow not t 
pay support in this particular instance, or any ongoing—didn1 
show any motive on his part." TR. 3/2/92, 162. 
3. The case originally proceeded to trial on February 2 
5 
1992- A jury was seated and sworn, TR. 47 (2/28/92); however, the 
court declared a mistrial when one of the jurors overheard a 
hallway discussion between the prosecutor and Mr. Barlow's ex-wife. 
TR. 54 (2/28/92). The subject matter of the conversation was ruled 
inadmissible at trial. TR. 50-51 (2/28/92). 
4. The trial was rescheduled for the following Monday, March 
2, 1992. 
5. Before trial both parties stipulated to the following 
matters: 
(a) A certified copy of Elroy and Kathleen Barlow's divorce 
decree, TR. 48 (3/2/92), see also Plaintiff's exhibit 1 (A copy of 
the Decree of Divorce is attached hereto as addendum "C"; 
(b) that Mr. Barlow "has two children . • . [and] there's a 
$150 child support obligation due on each child each month for a 
total of $300." TR. 48 (3/2/92); 
(c) that Mr. Barlow made no payments in January 1991, a $218 
payment in February, no payment in March, $55 in April, $164 in 
May, and no payments in June, July, and August. Tr. 51-52 (3/2/92); 
see also Plaintiff's Exhibit II, (a copy of plaintiff's exhibit II 
is attached as Addendum "D" ); and 
(d) that Mr. Barlow's two "children are in needy 
circumstances." TR. 53 (3/2/92). 
6. The State presented testimony from four witnesses. TR. 47-
88 (3/2/92). 
7. Two of the witnesses testified that Mr. Barlow made only 
partial payments during the eight month charging period, See 
6 
Testimony of Kathleen Barlow, TR. 47-60 (3/2/92); Testimony of 
Leslie Hunter, TR. 61-70 (3/2/92). 
8. The other two witnesses had minimal contact with Mr. 
Barlow. One contact consisted of a brief visit with Mr. Barlow; 
the other contact was a brief phone call. See Testimony of Kelly 
Page, TR. 71-74 (3/2/92); Testimony of Crystal Larsen, TR. 76-88 
(3/2/92). 
9. Kathleen Barlow, Mr. Barlow's ex-wife, testified that two 
children were born during the marriage, that the divorce decree 
required Mr. Barlow to pay support payments of $300 per month, and 
that she had only received partial payments for the period between 
January and August, 1991. TR. 48-52 (3/2/92). Kathleen Barlow had 
no contact with Mr. Barlow from January to August, 1991 and instead 
received the child support payments directly from the State. TR. 
59 (3/2/92). She also had no personal knowledge of his ability to 
work, earn money, or pay child support during the charging period 
because she "[hadn't] even talked with him." In fact the last time 
she had any contact with Mr. Barlow was four years earlier, in 
1988, at a court hearing. TR. 59-60 (3/2/92). The last actual 
knowledge she had that Mr. Barlow was employed was in 1984, eight 
years prior to trial. TR. 58, 59. see also TR. 120 (3/2/92) 
(Kathleen Barlow and Mr. Barlow were separated in 1984). 
10. Leslie Hunter, the state's second witness, was employee 
by the Utah Attorney General's office as a criminal non-suppor^ 
agent. TR. 62 (3/2/92). Ms. Hunter responsibilities include 
"researchCing] the case and filting] the charges against Mr 
7 
Barlow." TR. 62 (3/2/92). As part of her investigation Ms. Hunter 
"had no knowledge directly from Mr. Barlow" as to why the full 
child support payments were not being made. She admitted, however, 
that if a person was "unemployable because of [an] injury . . . 
[then the state] would not bother going ahead and expending the 
time, effort and money on behalf of the State to pursue the 
collection or to pursue the criminal charges." TR. 68-69 (3/2/92). 
Her investigation here consisted of "reviewing] the case to see if 
[she] feelfs] like it meets criminal non-support standards," TR. 
62 (3/2/92), reviewing the case with the prosecutor, swearing out 
an information, issuing a warrant of arrest, TR. 62 (3/2/92), and 
preparing state's exhibit number 2, TR. 62 (3/2/92). She had no 
direct contact with Mr. Barlow and offered no testimony on Mr. 
Barlow's ability to work, his ability to earn income, or his 
present income. 
11. Officer Kelly Page arrested Mr. Barlow on September 26, 
1991, twenty-six days after the close of the charging period. He 
observed Mr. Barlow in a shop "working on [a] pickup truck." TR. 
73 (3/2/92). He had no contact with Mr. Barlow from January to 
August, 1991. TR. 74 (3/2/92). 
12. Crystal Larsen, the State's final witness, was employed as 
"an investigative technician for the Office of Recovery Services." 
TR. 76 (3/2/92). Her investigation in this case consisted of 
calling a business named M & R Enterprises and asking for Elroy 
Barlow. She made the telephone call on September 13, 1992, 
thirteen days after the close of the charging period. TR. 76 
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(3/2/92). She further admitted that as an investigator for the 
state she is responsible for putting together evidence for the 
state. TR. 79-80 (3/2/92). Here, her investigation of the case 
began on September 13, 1992, and consisted of one brief phone call 
with Mr. Barlow. TR. 80 (3/2/92). She neither investigated the 
case nor attempted to contact Mr. Barlow during the time period 
from January to August, 1991. TR. 80-81 (3/2/92). Furthermore she 
did no investigation into "how much money Mr. Barlow was making." 
TR. 83, (3/2/92). The only information that Ms. Larsen discovered 
was that "[alpparently [Mrs. Barlow] owns [a] business . . • [alnd 
[Mr. Barlow] helps to run it." TR. 87 (3/2/92). 
13. Mr. Barlow testified that he was divorced from Kathleen 
Barlow, that two children were born as a result of the marriage, 
and that he was required to pay a total of $300 in monthly child 
support. TR. 90 (3/2/92). He also stated that his wife owned a 
business known as M & R Enterprises and that he helped work in the 
business as a body worker. TR. 90-91 (3/2/92). From the time 
period between January and August, 1991, Mr. Barlow "tried to work 
every time period—every space in time [he] could." TR. 90 
(3/2/92). However, since contracting spinal meningitis several 
years earlier, his immune system became weakened. TR. 94 (3/2/92). 
In late November, 1990, he began experiencing flu-lik< 
symptoms which required hospitalization and doctor's care. TR. 9 
(3/2/92). On November 21, 1990, he went to the FHP Emergency Car 
Center on Redwood Road in Salt Lake City because he was vomitir 
9 
and having dizzy spells- TR. 92 (3/2/92). The original symptoms 
— "vomiting and intense pain, lack of vision" — persisted into 
the month of January, 1991. TR. 95 (3/2/92). He failed to make a 
January child support payment because he was "down all month, every 
day . . . ," unable to work, and "[unlable to get out of bed . • 
. ." TR. 96 (3/2/92). In February, Mr. Barlow started to 
recuperate. He was able to work for part of the month and made a 
$218 payment. TR. 97 (3/2/92). In March, Mr. Barlow contracted 
cellulitis, a swelling of the arms treated with bed rest and 
constant I.V.'s. He spent most of the month hooked to an I.V. 
bottle in an attempt to reduce the swelling in his elbows. TR. 98 
(3/2/92). He made approximately nine visits to the doctor in 
March, and "was not able to work." TR. 99 (3/2/92). In April, Mr. 
Barlow was still recovering from the cellulitis; nonetheless he 
made a $55 child support payment. TR. 101 (3/2/92). He also 
testified that his work in the shop was his only source of income, 
and that [e]very month that [he] worked . . . [he] made a payment 
or an effort [to pay]." TR. 102 (3/2/92). In July, Mr. Barlow 
contracted shingles, a nerve condition that causes the body to 
break out. TR. 104 (3/2/92). He could not work after contracting 
the shingles because he was unable to wear a shirt or clothes. TR 
104 (3/2/92). 
M & R Enterprises, Mr. Barlow's sole source of income, 
1
 See also R. 149 (doctor's letter explaining results of 
neuropsychological testing). Dr. Currier's letter was introduced 
at the time of sentencing and concisely explains the physical and 
psychological problems that Mr. Barlow described at trial. 
10 
operated at a loss and the business was closed in August, 1991. TR. 
105, 117-18 (3/2/92) see also TR.102 (3/2/92) (the shop was Mr. 
Barlow's sole source of income). In answer to questions posed by 
the prosecutor, Mr. Barlow stated that he owned no vehicles and 
that he was unable to "meet [his] other financial obligations. . . 
.
M
 TR. 114 (3/2/92). He also stated that he was evicted from his 
premises because he could not afford the rent. TR. 115 (3/2/92). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION BECAUSE IT DID NOT PROVE EACH ELEMENT OF THE CRIME 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
A. Summary of Argument 
The state failed to present evidence demonstrating that Mr. 
Barlow's failure to pay was intentional and without just cause. No 
witness proved that Mr. Barlow had the ability to work, the 
resources to pay the full support obligation, or possessed the 
ability to earn income. As such the state failed to prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Barlow's failure to pay was done 
knowingly and without just cause. On the contrary, the evidence 
showed that Mr. Barlow was extremely ill, had little if any assets 
to pay child support obligations, and was unable to meet his livim 
and other expenses. 
B. The Burden of Proof 
11 
An accused person has the right to appear and defend in 
person, to be represented by counsel, and to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him. Utah Constitution art. I, S 
12. Those accused of crime have no duty to produce evidence nor 
must they testify or give evidence. Id. The burden of proving each 
element of a crime rests with the state. United States 
Constitution, Amends. V, VI, XIV; Utah Constitution, art. I, § 12; 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1990)2; In Re Wanship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970); State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. 829 (1913) (State must 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused "without just 
excuse willfully neglected and refused to provide . . ." for the 
support of his children). 
A defendant may sometimes be required to bring forward some 
evidence of an affirmative defense.3 See State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 
775, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, affirmative defenses in 
Utah are identified by statute, see supra note 3, and none of those 
defenses are applicable here. 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1990) reads in pertinent part as 
follOWS: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to 
be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
3
 The Utah Legislature created seven affirmative defenses: 
(1) compulsion (§ 76-2-302); (2) entrapment (§76-2-303); (3) 
ignorance or mistake of fact or law (§ 76-2-304); (4) mistake as to 
victim's age (§ 76-2-304.5); (5) mental illness (§76-2-305); (6) 
voluntary intoxication (§76-2-306); (7) voluntary termination of 
efforts (§ 76-2-307). 
12 
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
When reviewing a case on sufficiency of evidence grounds an 
appellate court will "review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict ." State v. Booker, 709 P. 2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985). The court will "reverse a jury verdict only if 'the 
evidence . . . is [so] sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted.1" State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). When the 
prosecutor presents only circumstantial evidence it must be of 
"such quality or quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Span, 819 P.2d at 332 (quoting State 
v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)). 
An appellate challenging the sufficiency of evidence in 
support of a conviction must also "marshal 1 the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings." State v. 
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
D. The Elements of Criminal Non-Support 
The Utah criminal non-support statute4 requires the state t 
* Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) reads as follows: 
( D A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spou* 
or children under the age of sixteen years, he knowingly a1 
without just cause fails to provide for the support of the spou 
13 
prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) That Mr. Barlow has children under sixteen years of age;5 
(2) That Mr. Barlow knowingly failed to provide for the 
children's support; 
(3) That Mr. Barlow's failure to provide support was without 
just cause; and 
(4) That Mr. Barlow's children were in needy circumstances. 6 
E. Knowledge and Without Just Cause 
Utah's criminal non-support statute excuses those persons, who 
with just cause cannot pay their child support obligations. Bess, 
137 P. at 832; See also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 
(1983) (an accused who cannot "make sufficient bona fide efforts to 
legally require resources to pay [a fine or restitution]. . ." 
cannot be incarcerated). 
In considering whether a defendant's failure to pay child 
support was without just cause other jurisdictions have held that 
the state must show that the accused had the ability to work and 
the resources to pay. State v. Nelson, 463 S.W. 2d 614, 617 (Mo. 
App. 1971) (evidence insufficient to support conviction when state 
or children when either is in needy circumstances. 
5
 Mr. Barlow conceded this element. TR. 48 (3/2/92). 
* Mr. Barlow also conceded this element. 
7
 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) involved a post-
conviction revocation hearing where the court had originally 
suspended Bearden's sentence upon the condition that he pay a fine. 
Bearden, who was indigent, was unable to pay the fine because he 
was unable to find a job and had no income or assets. The court 
was thus compelled to impose a punishment other than jail. Id- at 
672. 
14 
failed to present evidence to show that the accused was working, 
that work was available to him, or that he was physically able to 
work);8 Burris v. State, 382 N.E. 2d 963, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th 
Dist. 1978) (state failed to meet its burden of proof when it 
failed to show that accused had a job and was physically able to 
work);9 State v. Johnson, 412 So. 2d 602, 604 (La. 1982) ("an 
accused cannot be constitutionally convicted for failing to make 
support payments during a period when he did not have the financial 
means or ability to provide support."); Taylor v. State, 710 P.2d 
1019. 1021 (AK App. 1985) (State is required to show that accused 
"either actually had funds available for payment of support or that 
he could have obtained such funds through reasonable efforts."). 
See also Ziealer v. Butler, 410 So. 2d 93, 94 (Ala Civ. App. 1982) 
(an accused cannot be imprisoned due to an inability to pay child 
support when he had no assets, had lost his job and had no money to 
pay). 
In proving that an accused "knowingly and without just cause" 
failed to provide support, the state must do more than simply 
0
 The Missouri Statute in effect at that time is similar to 
Utah's present non-support statute and made it a crime for an 
accused to "unlawfully and wilfully fail, neglect and refuse to 
provide, without good cause, the necessary and proper food, 
clothing, maintenance and support for his lawful minor children." 
Nelson, 463 S.W.2d 614. 
?
 The Indiana statute in effect at the time of the Burris 
case made it a crime for an accused "who being able either by 
reason of having means or by personal services, labor or earnings, 
shall wilfully neglect or refuse to provide such child or childrer 
with necessary and proper home, care, food and clothing . • . .' 
Burris, 382 N.E. 2d at 964 n. 2. The Indiana law was subsequent 1' 
amended later in 1978. See Davis v. State, 481 N.E. 2d 434, 43 
(Ind. App. 3 Dist. 1985) 
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present evidence showing that the payments were not made. Thus 
the state must show "beyond a reasonable doubt • . . that the 
defendant without just excuse willfully neglected and refused to 
provide for [his children's] support and maintenance. . . . " Bess, 
137 P. at 832. In Bess, the Utah Supreme Court reversed Mr. Bess's 
conviction for criminal non-support finding that the state "wholly 
failted] to show willfull neglect.11 In Bess, the undisputed 
evidence showed that the Mr. Bess's expenses exceeded his income, 
that he had attempted to work, and that he did not waste his 
earnings "in dissipation or riotous living." 137 P. at 832. The 
Utah Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, found that Mr. 
Bess's income exceeded his income. Id.- The court concluded that 
the State failed to "establish!!] by evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that . . . [Mr. Bess] with just excuse willfully neglected 
and refused to provide for the [support of his children]." Id. 
1U
 Utah does not have a prima facie statute like some other 
states. See State v. Shaw, 96 Idaho 250, 253 (Idaho 1975) (proof 
of neglect to furnish support under Idaho statute is prima facie 
evidence that the failure to provide support is wilful); Davis v. 
State, 481 N.E. 2d at 435 (inability to pay support is made an 
affirmative defense by statute). Rather Utah requires the state to 
prove each element and does not equate the mere failure to pay with 
a prima facie case. Bess, 137 P. at 832. 
11
 The criminal non-support statute in effect in 1913 read in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Any person who shall without just excuse, desert or 
willfully neglect or refuse to provide for the support 
and maintenance of his or her minor child or children 
under the age of sixteen years, in destitute or 
necessitous circumstances, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor . . . ." 
See Bess, 137 P.2d at 830 (citing Utah Sess. Laws 1911, c. 105, § 
1.) 
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F. Marshalling the Evidence 
The following section is an attempt to marshal 1 the evidence 
in support of the lower court's verdict. See Moore, 802 P. 2d at 
738. After marshalling the evidence, the remaining paragraphs will 
show how the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. 
The first two witnesses for the state, Kathleen Barlow and 
Leslie Hunter, both testified that Mr. Barlow made only partial 
support payments during the charging period. TR. 51-52 (3/2/92), 
Tr. 62-63 (3/2/92). Kathleen Barlow also stated that her two 
children were in needy circumstances. TR. 52-54. She knew of no 
reason why Mr. Barlow could not provide child support, TR. 56, but 
admitted that she had not spoken with Mr. Barlow since 1988. TR. 
60. She concluded that Mr. Barlow was working from January to 
August, 1991, but her knowledge of his work was ruled to be 
inadmissible hearsay. TR. 56-57. The last time she personally knew 
that Mr. Barlow was working was eight years earlier in 1984, when 
the couple was still married. TR. 57. Her only knowledge of Mr. 
Barlow's job skills and ability to work were gleaned during their 
marriage in the early 1980's. TR. 57. In 1984 she knew that Mr. 
Barlow was skilled in body and paint work and in car sales. TR. 57. 
The state's investigation was conducted by three witnesses. 
Leslie Hunter's investigation consisted of "review!ingl the case to 
see if [she felt] like it meets criminal non-support standards," 
reviewing the case with the prosecutor, swearing out the 
information and issuing the warrant of arrest. TR. 62. She 
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conducted no further investigation because someone else was 
responsible for monitoring the case from January to August, 1991. 
TR. 69 (3/2/92). She authenticated State's Exhibit No. 2, which 
detailed the pattern of Mr. Barlow's support payments in the months 
from January to August, 1991. TR. 63. Mr. Barlow previously 
stipulated to this evidence. During the limited investigation she 
had no personal contact with Mr. Barlow and had no personal 
knowledge as to any reason why Mr. Barlow failed to pay all of the 
required child support. TR. 65. She received the file from the 
civil division, who do "most of the investigation," and she merely 
files the criminal charges as if she "feelEs] like it meets 
criminal nonsupport standards." TR. 62. 
Ms. Hunter was familiar with cases where individuals were sick 
or injured and unable to work. TR. 68. When she is aware that 
someone is sick or injured she tries to determine "whether or not 
[the person is] unemployable because of their injury." TR. 68. If 
a person was sick or injured and unable to work Ms. Hunter would be 
unwilling to pursue the criminal charges. Tr. 69. Here she had no 
knowledge of Mr. Barlow's illness. 
The second investigator, Murray City Police Officer Kelly 
Page, arrested Mr. Barlow at 4195 South 500 West. TR. 71. The 
arrest occurred on September 26, 1991, twenty-six days after the 
close of the charging period. TR. 72, 74 Inside the building, 
Page observed a pickup truck, a compressor that was running, tools, 
and an office. TR. 72. Mr. Barlow was working on the pickup truck 
and the shop "did look as though he would be able to work on a 
18 
vehicle there." TR. 73- He offered no testimony as to Mr. 
Barlow's income or ability to earn income from working. 
The state's final investigator, Crystal Larsen, called M & R 
Enterprises and spoke with a person who identified himself as Elroy 
Barlow. TR. 77. She made the call on September 13, 1991, thirteen 
days after the close of the charging period. TR. 80. She had no 
contact with Mr. Barlow from January to August 1991. TR. 80-81. 
She admitted that she conducted no investigation into how much 
money Mr.. Barlow made during January or any of the other months. 
TR. 84. Because her role in the investigation was very limited, 
she did "not know if [Mr. Barlow] is making a certain amount of 
money in a certain amount of months due to whatever reasons." TR. 
85. 
Elroy Barlow admitted that he was divorced from Kathleen 
Barlow, that two children were born during the marriage, and that 
he was required to pay a total of $300 in monthly child support. 
TR. 90 (3/2/92). His current wife owned a business known as M & R 
Enterprises which he helped operate when healthy enough to do so. 
TR. 90-91 (3/2/92). Mr. Barlow's sole source of income was from M 
& R Enterprises. TR. 102. Unfortunately, the business operated at 
a loss and was eventually closed in August, 1991. TR. 105, 117-18 
(3/2/92). "Every month [he was able to] work . . . [Mr. Barlow] 
made a payment or an effort." TR. 102 (3/2/92). 
From the time period between January and August, 1991, Mr. 
Barlow "tried to work every time period—every space in time [he! 
could." TR. 90 (3/2/92). However, since contracting spinal 
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meningitis, his immune system became weakened. TR. 94 (3/2/92). 
On November 21, 1990, went to see the doctor at the FHP on 
Redwood Road in Salt Lake City. He contracted a flu virus causing 
him to vomit and have dizzy spells. TR. 92 (3/2/92).12 The 
original symptoms — "vomiting and intense pain, lack of vision" -
- persisted into the month of January, 1991. TR. 95 (3/2/92). He 
failed to make a January child support payment because he was "down 
all month, every day . . . ," unable to work, and "[unlable to get 
out of bed . . . ." TR. 96 (3/2/92). In February, Mr. Barlow 
started to recuperate, was able to work for part of the month, and 
made a $218 payment. TR. 97 (3/2/92). In March, Mr. Barlow 
contracted cellulitis, and spent most of the month hooked to an 
I.V. bottle in an attempt to reduce the swelling in his elbows. 
TR. 98 (3/2/92). He made approximately nine visits to the doctor 
in March, and "was not able to work." TR. 99 (3/2/92). In April, 
Mr. Barlow was still recovering from the cellulitis; he nonetheless 
made a $55 child support payment. TR. 101 (3/2/92). In July, Mr. 
Barlow contracted Shingles, a nerve condition that causes the body 
to break out. TR. 104 (3/2/92). He could not work after 
contracting the shingles because he was unable to wear a shirt or 
clothes. TR 104 (3/2/92) . 
Mr. Barlow owned no vehicles and was unable to "meet [his] 
other financial obligations. . . . " TR. 114 (3/2/92). He was 
11
 See also R. 149 9 (doctor's letter explaining results of 
neuropsychological testing). Dr. Currier's letter was introduced 
at the time of sentencing and concisely explains the physical and 
psychological problems that Mr. Barlow described at trial. 
20 
evicted from his homes because he was unable to pay the rent. TR. 
115 (3/2/92). 
G. The Evidence is Insufficient to Sustain the Conviction 
To prove that the failure to pay child support was "without 
just cause" the state must establish that Mr. Barlow had the 
financial ability to pay support. Bess, 137 P. at 832. Taylor, 710 
P.2d at 1021. In Taylor, the Alaska Supreme Court in addressing a 
similar question ruled as follows 
we interpret "without lawful excuse" to mean that the 
state is required to establish, as an element of criminal 
nonsupport . . . that the accused had the financial 
ability to pay support—that is, that the accused either 
actually had funds available for payment of support or 
that he could have obtained such funds through reasonable 
efforts. 
Taylor, 710 P.2d at 1021. 
Here, the state failed to meet its burden of proof. It 
presented no evidence that Mr. Barlow actually had the financial 
resources to pay child support.13 See Taylor, 710 P. 2d at 1024 
(State introduced evidence that defendant earned $42,000 during one 
year period encompassing charges); People v. James, 411 N.E. 2d 
563, 565 (111. App. 1980) (evidence of prior years income tax 
returns sufficient to show that accused had financial resources to 
pay support). Nor did the state show that he actually had funds 
1J
 The sole evidence on this point was from Mr. Barlow himself 
who stated that his only source of income was from M & R 
Enterprises, TR. 102 (3/2/92), that he was unable to meet his other 
financial obligations, TR. 114 (3/2/92), that he was unable to work 
because of medical problems, TR. 92-110 (3/2/92), and that he made 
his best efforts to pay whenever he was healthy enough to work. 
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available to make the payments. Id. See State v. Jackson, 485 So. 
2d 630, 634 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986) (State proved that accused 
worked at full time job, maintained home, and owned personal 
property). No witness testified that Mr. Barlow had a steady 
income, maintained a home, or owned personal property. 
Furthermore, no investigator visited M & R Enterprises during the 
charging period or spoke with Mr. Barlow, during the period when he 
was ill. Finally, there was no evidence to show that Mr. 
Barlow could have obtained funds through reasonable efforts. See 
Taylor, 710 P.2d 1021. His sole source of income was from M & R 
Enterprises, a business that operated at a loss and was 
subsequently closed. With the limited income he did make, he made 
every effort to pay support and indeed made partial payments in 
several of the months in question. 
The testimony of his ex-wife stating that he was employed 
eight years earlier is insufficient to support the conviction. 
Burris v. State, 382 N.E. 2d 963, 965 (Ct. App. Ind. 1978) (ex-
wife's knowledge that accused was employed during marriage is 
insufficient to establish that accused is capable of work eight 
years later). Similarly, Investigator Larsen's phone call and 
officer Page's arrest of Mr. Barlow both occurred after the period 
in which he was charged and that evidence is irrelevant, id. at 
966. (evidence gathered before charging period relating to an 
accused's ability to work is irrelevant to the period charged in 
the information). 
When considering this evidence in the light most favorable to 
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the verdict, the state has failed to prove that Mr. Barlow had the 
resources or income to pay child support. See Taylor, 710 P.2d at 
1021; Bess, 137 P.2d at 832; Johnson, 412 So. 2d at 604; Burris, 
382 N.E. 2d at 967. In reversing a conviction for the criminal 
non-support the Indiana Court of Appeals stated that 
There is no evidence as to whether he [the defendant] actually 
was working during the period of time covered by the 
information, no evidence to prove that work was available to 
him, no evidence except the conclusion of complainant, that he 
was physically able to work. 
Burris, 382 N.E. 2d at 967 (quoting Nelson, 463 S-W. 2d at 617). 
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO A PRIVATE PRE-TRIAL 
MEETING WITH MR. BARLOW AND HIS REVELATION ABOUT DISCUSSIONS IN 
THAT MEETING AND HIS REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Mr. Barlow testified that none of the people who testified for 
the state spoke with him until after the close of the charging 
period. TR. 105. He was then asked the following questions: 
Q: [By Mr. Mauro]: You didn't tell anyone from the Attorney 
General's Office [about your medical problems]? 
A: [By Mr. Barlow]: Yeah. I did. 
Q: Who did you tell? 
A: Jeff. I told Jeff. 
Q: And when you say Jeff, who are you referring to? 
A: Well, Jeff Hunt. 
Q: When did you—what did you tell Jeff and when did you tell 
you tell him about that? 
A: Well, he—he wanted me to come in, I got papers to come in 
and see the Assistant Attorney General, Jeff Hunt. 
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Q: And did you do that ? 
A: And so I did. I did that. 
Q: And did you tell him about your medical problems? 
A: Yeah. I told him that I had a real hard time—in that time 
there, and that I was un—able to pay, you know, and do you want me 
to keep going, and tell what he told me and back and forth. 
Q: [by Mr. Mauro] No. 
Later, while Mr. Hunt was cross-examining Mr. Barlow he asked 
about the pre-trial meeting held in his office: 
Q: [By Mr. Hunt]: Now, you—you related to the jury a meeting 
that you and I had in my office— 
A: [By Mr. Barlow]: Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q: —some months ago. And you remember that meeting? 
A: Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q: Okay. And that was prior to our office filing these charges 
in this matter, wasn't it? 
A: Right. That's right. 
Q: And that was an attempt— 
MR. MAURO: Well, your honor. Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q: (By Mr. Hunt) During that meeting, during the course of 
that meeting, did I attempt to work out— 
MR. MAURO: Objection. Could we approach? 
THE COURT: Sustained 
(Whereupon, an off-record discussion was held at side bar.) 
THE COURT: The jury will disregard the last question. 
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TR. 111-112. 
Still later during cross-examination, Mr. Hunt inquired into 
an area that the court had previously declared inadmissible: 
Q: (By Mr. Hunt) Since the filing of this action, have you 
attempted to catch up on your— 
MR. MAURO: Objection, your honor. 
Q: (By Mr. Hunt) —past support— 
MR. MAURO: Relevance 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
TR. 115 (3/2/92). 
Again during closing argument Mr. Hunt revisited the subject 
of the private meeting between himself and Mr. Barlow, this time 
divulging previously undisclosed communications: 
(By Mr. Hunt) Mr. Barlow has told me in the past, before I 
filed this matter, that he has been sick and been ill, and he's 
testified to that. And he testified as to a meeting that he had 
with me early on, and I — I have known a bit that he has been in the 
doctors on occasions in the past. He's never provided me with any 
evidence of such, but— 
MR. MAURO: Objection, your Honor. Objection. TR. 149. 
The court sustained the objection and admonished the prosecutor: 
THE COURT: You can't testify here today. This is argument of 
stuff that's been introduced into evidence. 
The jury will disregard any testimony that seems to be being 
offered by the attorney. 
Mr. Hunt, please limit your argument to what has been 
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testified to. 
TR. 149-50. 
The prosecutor, again during the rebuttal stage of closing 
argument, discussed evidence relating to the pre-trial meeting 
which was not introduced at trial: 
[closing argument by Mr. Hunt]: The State has known, contrary 
to what defense counsel asserts, the State has known that Mr. 
Barlow was going to claim that he had been to doctors before.1* 
Mr. Barlow himself testified that he met with me prior to this 
action. 
MR. MAURO: Objection again, your Honor. 
MR. HUNT: He—they opened the door, that draws an objection 
the first time, and they opened the door, your Honor. 
MR. MAURO: Judge--
THE COURT: Well, that was his testimony. I '11 let you argue 
the testimony, Mr. Hunter (sic), but this is only closing argument. 
Okay. 
MR. HUNT: I understand.15 
14
 No state witness mentioned anything about Mr. Barlow seeing 
a doctor or having medical problems. In fact none of State's 
witnesses even talked with Mr. Barlow or investigated the case 
during the charging period. 
15
 Defense counsel moved for a mistrial outside the presence 
of the jury. The court denied the motion. TR. 159, 164-166 
(3/2/92). The motion for mistrial and court's ruling are attached 
as addendum "E." See State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 277, 287 
(Utah 1989) (when defendant, at close of penalty phase of trial, 
but before jury has returned a sentence, moves for mistrial on 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during penalty 
phase, issue of prosecutorial conduct is preserved for appeal). 
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A, Test for Determining Prosecutorial Misconduct 
In determining whether a prosecutor's improper 
statements constitute reversible error Utah courts apply a two-
prong test: 
[1] did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in considering 
in determining their verdict, and [2] were they, under 
the circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by the remarks* 
E.g., State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). 
The courts analyze the first step in a common sense manner 
asking whether the prosecutor "calUed] attention to matters 
outside the evidence." Troy, 688 P.2d at 486 (prosecutor 
mentioning that defendant had been involved in various criminal 
activities and comparing him to John Hinckley were matters outside 
the evidence); State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986) 
(improper for prosecutor to argue that defendant's prior criminal 
conviction demonstrated his criminal character). 
Applying the first prong here, the prosecutor clearly called 
to the jury's attention matters not presented during the trial. 
He first attempted to elicit information about his direct 
communications with Barlow during cross-examination.18 He asked 
about the date and location of a pre-trial meeting, attended by 
10
 Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 (e) prohibits an 
opponent from "alludting] to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue 
except when testifying as witness, or state a personal opinion as 
to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the 
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an 
accused . . . . " 
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only by Mr. Barlow and Mr. Hunt, and then suggested that the 
meeting was an attempt to work out some type of settlement. TR. 
111-112. The court sustained the objection.1' He also commented 
on matters "not supported by admissible evidence" and "assert[edl 
personal knowledge of facts in issue." See Utah Rule of Pro. 
10 
Responsibility 3.4 (e). 
The court's analysis of step two involves a consideration of 
the circumstances of the case as a whole. Span, 819 P.2d at 335. 
Generally, when the evidence of defendant's guilt is strong, the 
misconduct will be ruled harmless. Id. at 336 (prosecutorial 
misconduct ruled harmless error, but case remanded back to trial 
court to consider appropriate disciplinary action against 
prosecutor). However, when the evidence of guilt is weak, the 
court will closely scrutinize the conduct. Span, 819 P.2d at 335. 
11
 Utah Rule of Evidence 410 makes statements made in the 
course of plea negotiations inadmissible. Mr. Barlow testified 
that he had spoken with Mr. Hunt before trial telling him about his 
medical problems. He did not discuss plea negations nor did he 
speak about anything that Mr. Hunt said. He merely told the jury 
that he spoke with one of the State's representatives about on-
going medical problems. Mr. Barlow offered to describe the 
additional matters discussed in the meeting but was limited by his 
attorney: A [By Mr. Barlow]: Yeah. I told [Mr. Hunt] that I had a 
real hard time—in that time there, and that I was un—able to pay, 
you know, and do you want me to keep going, and tell what he told 
me and back and forth. 
Q: [by Mr. Mauro] No. 
TR. 106 (3/2/92). 
18
 He told the jury that he personally knew of Mr. Barlow's 
visits to the doctor but that "[Mr. Barlow's] never provided me 
with any evidence of such. . . . " TR. 149 (3/2/92). These remarks 
were improper because they called to the jury's attention matters 
that were not introduced into evidence. Additionally, those 
comments were stated from the prosecutor's personal knowledge. 
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The court will reverse when "there is a reasonable likelihood that 
absent the errors a different result would have occurred." Emmett, 
184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. 
Here, there was not compelling proof of Mr. Barlow's guilt. 
No state witness rebutted the medical testimony nor did they 
investigate Mr. Barlow's reason for the incomplete payments. The 
jurors "were probably influenced by" Mr. Hunt's comments when they 
learned that Mr. Barlow never provided the medical reports to the 
Attorney General's office before trial. This statement suggested 
to the jury that Mr. Barlow was fabricating the medical records 
because the prosecutor never saw them before trial. See Emmett, 184 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (improper comments which undermine the heart 
of an accused's defense constitute reversible error). 
The statements were also improper because Mr. Hunt asserted 
personal knowledge of facts not in evidence. See Utah R. Pro. 
Responsibility 3.4 (e); Span, 819 P.2d at 336 n. 4. He improperly 
undermin€*d the defendant's testimony by stating his personal 
knowledge of Mr. Barlow's medical condition. This again implied 
that Mr. Barlow's testimony was untruthful or trivial. That 
inadmissible evidence could cause the jury to conclude that Mr. 
Barlow's claims were frivolous or insignificant.15 Finally, Mr. 
Hunt was repeatedly admonished that the discussions of the pre-
trial meeting and his personal knowledge of Mr. Barlow's medical 
iS
 Mr. Hunt was not subject to cross-examination like the 
other witnesses. Furthermore, no state witness had knowledge of 
Mr. Barlow's medical condition. 
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condition were inadmissible. TR. 115 (3/2/92); TR. 149-50.'u 
Nevertheless, he discussed the issue twice during closing argument/ 
once during his direct closing argument and once during his 
rebuttal. The appellate courts have consistently held that 
improper argument in a close case such as this is reversible error. 
Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36; Troy, 688 P.2d at 487; Tarafa, 
720 P.2d at 1372. The Utah Supreme Court described the 
prosecutor's duty as follows: 
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in 
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and 
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He 
may prosecute with earnest and vigor—indeed, he should do so. 
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction 
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one. 
Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (quoting Beraer v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Barlow asks this court to reverse his conviction for 
criminal non-support because the evidence was insufficient to the 
support the conviction. Mr. Barlow also asks the court to reverse 
because the prosecutor's comments were improper and "probably" 
zu
 Mr. Hunt also attempted to question Mr. Barlow about 
arrearages which were previously ruled inadmissible and tried to 
put on rebuttal evidence of prior arrearages. TR. 131, 162-164. 
(3/2/92). 
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influenced the verdict. 
DATED this Yy day of October, 1992. 
Pm**^^" 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
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Art. I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid 
because it delegates to industrial commission 
the power to hear, consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122 
(1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next 
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L Rev. 266. 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law §§ 613 to 617. 
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437. 
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
limited to recovery under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act exclusively, unless they have as-
signed their rights to insurance carrier. Robin-
son v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 
(1927). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential-
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
A.L.R.4th 1196. 
False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244. 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A.L.R.4th 404. 
Libel or slander: defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520. 
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1000. 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable. 
70 A.L.R.4th 984. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Lav* 
«=> 322, 324, 327, 328. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Gourt of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
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other prosecution of defendant for similar act trix was first defiled by defendant or some 
alleged to have been committed within same other person was not germane to any issue in 
period and within same jurisdiction; it was oth- case, and was, therefore, wholly immaterial 
erwise if adulterous act was alleged to have and should have been excluded as prejudicial 
been committed at particularly described to defendant. State v. Hansen, 40 Utah 418, 
place. State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 P. 122 P 375 (1912) 
306 (1915). 
n . . , , . A. Persons liable. 
- R i s i n g and waiving objections.
 C n m e o f a d u l t e d i d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e Where defense to charge of rape amounted to ,
 r . , j r o w J? r J * * j r criminal concurrence of two persons, and may 
admission of adultery, defendant convicted of , , .. , . .T
 x ,. r .,
 J 
latter could not object to .nformat.on as duplic h?Ye b ( ?" «>™»"f <* notwithstanding failure 
itous where he had interposed no special de- ° f f e ™' e *° c o ^ e n t ° l ^ { W i ^ f ? * * 
murrer thereto and had waived preliminary d o *°_ S t a t e v- Wade> 6 6 U t a h 2 6 7 ' 2 4 1 R 8 3 8 
examination as to adultery, by failure to move ( iy^0'-
to quash duplicitous information charging both Presumptions 
ITolfv**™ n Q O ^ V* A n d e r t 0 n ' 6 9 U t a h In prosecution for adultery, it was presumed 
53, 252 P. 280 (1J26).
 t h a t fourteen-year-old prosecutrix was unmar-
Issues. ried, in absence of evidence to contrary. State 
In prosecution for adultery, whether prosecu- v. Wade, 66 Utah 267, 241 P. 838 (1925). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adultery and tery and fornication criminal offenses, 41 
Fornication § 2. A.L.R.3d 1338. 
C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adultery § 3. Key Numbers. — Adultery «=» 1. 
A.L.R. — Validity of statute making adul-
76-7-104. Fornication. 
(1) Any unmarried person who shall voluntarily engage in sexual inter-
course with another is guilty of fornication. 
(2) Fornication is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-7-104, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-104. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adultery and tery and fornication criminal offenses, 41 
Fornication § 8. A.L.R.3d 1338. 
C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Fornication § 2. Key Numbers. — Fornication «= 1. 
A.L.R. — Validity of statute making adul-
PART 2 
NONSUPPORT AND SALE OF CHILDREN 
76-7-201. Criminal nonsupport. 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse or children 
under the age of sixteen years, he knowingly and without just cause fails to 
provide for the support of the spouse or children when either is in needy 
circumstances. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
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(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree under the following 
circumstances: 
(a) If the actor has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, 
whether in this state or any other state; or 
(b) If the actor committed the offense while residing in another state. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock 
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a 
civil suit. 
(5) In a prosecution under this section, it is no defense that the person to be 
supported received necessary support from a source other than the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 76-7-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 21. 
Cross-References. — Power of juvenile 
court, § 78'3a-l et seq. 
ANALYSIS 
Defenses 
Duty of father. 
—In general. 
—Relief from duty to support. 
Failure of nonresident to support. 
Just cause 
Defenses. 
Under former Penal Code provision on deser-
tion of family it was no defense that destitute 
children were relieved by charitable acts of 
third persons. State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39,137 P. 
629 (1913). 
Duty of father. 
—In general. 
It was duty of father to support his minor 
children if he was able to do so; and it was 
cnmmal offense willfully to fail to support 
one's minor children under age of sixteen 
vears. Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 
55 Utah 566, 196 P. 556 (1921); Rockwood v. 
Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925). 
—Relief from duty to support 
Court had no right to make final order per-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband 
and Wife § 329. 
C.J.S. — 42 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 630. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
manently relieving father of his obligation to 
support his child, except under the Adoption 
Statute. Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah 2d 136, 329 
P.2d 878 (1958). 
Failure of nonresident to support 
Husband who was resident of another state 
could be charged with offense of failure to pro-
vide in state in which he had permitted his 
wife or children to live, or in which his miscon-
duct had induced them to seek refuge. Osborn 
v. Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949). 
Just cause. 
Under former § 76-15-1, it must have been 
shown beyond reasonable doubt that children 
were in destitute and necessitous circum-
stances, and father must have willfully ne-
glected and refused, without just cause, to pro-
vide for children; if it appeared that current 
and necessary expenses for himself and chil-
dren exceeded his earnings, that he had not 
remained idle when he could have obtained 
employment, and had not wasted any part of 
his earnings, he should have been acquitted. 
State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. 829 (1913). 
A.L.R. — Homicide by withholding food, 
clothing, or shelter, 61 A.L.R.3d 1207. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «=» 303. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
JEFFREY C. HUNT - 4988 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the plaintiff 
120 North 200 West 
Fourth Floor 
P.O. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELROY TAYLOR BARLOW, 
DOB: 12/22/53 
INFORMATION 
911^W 7^ MS 
Criminal No. 
Defendant. Bail $2,500 
COUNT NO. I 
CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT, a Class "A" Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or between January 1, 1991 through 
August 31, 1991, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 7, Section 
201, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
Elroy Taylor Barlow, did knowingly and without just cause, fail 
to provide for the support of his minor child(ren), to-wit: Rocky 
02/02/80, and Nicholas 09/23/84, said child(ren) being in needy 
circumstances: 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
COUNT NO. I: Affiant, Lesli J. Hunter, Criminal Nonsupport Agent 
for the Attorney General's Office received information from 
Kathleen Barlow, that the defendant, the natural parent of minor 
child(ren), Rocky 02/02/80, and Nicholas 09/23/84, has failed to 
provide for the support of his child(ren). Defendant is 
obligated to pay $150.00 per month per child pursuant to support 
order c85-1381 for the support of his child(ren). Between 
January 1, 1991 through August 31, 1991 the defendant should have 
paid $2,400.00, but has only paid $437.00 for the support of his 
child (ren), and the child (ren) of the Defendant have been in 
necessitous circumstances during the time period charged. 
DATED this ^5" day of J^plZ , 199 / . 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 
tfzl^ ~l ~" 199 ' . 
ciRCOir. J O D ^ ^ ^ J
 H GaHm 
This information is based on evidence otTfcfiHed from the 
following witnesses: 
Lesli J. Hunter 
Kathleen Wayne 
AUTHORIZED FOR PRESENTMENT 
AND FILING: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JEFmEW0. HUgT ~ \ ^ J 
Assistant Attorney General 
Defendant's Address: 
Elroy Taylor Barlow 
3165 West 3835 South, #F-101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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; 
PHILLIP B. SHELL (3861) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 262-6800 
nmmwr 
• J t.v V'J I-J a h- ii v; 2 FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Le!:a County Utah 
tk^Lly Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN M. BARLOW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELROY TAYLOR BARLOW, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D 85 1381 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on May 2, 1986/ the Honorable Raymond S. 
Uno, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting without a 
jury. The Plaintiff appeared in person and by her attorney, 
Phillip B. Shell. The Defendant did not appear. The Court 
received evidence on behalf of Plaintiff in support of her 
complaint, and, being fully advised in the premises and having 
rendered its decision herein by way of written Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and it appearing therefrom that Defen-
dant's answer should be stricken for his failure to appear, as 
well as submit a financial declaration, and that judgment should 
be entered for the Plaintiff in accordance therewith and as 
hereinafter set forth, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. Said Decree shall become final upon entry and is 
awarded by reason of grounds found by the Court in accordance 
with Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § 30-3-1, to wit: Defendant 
caused Plaintiff to suffer great mental distress. 
2. That Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control 
of the two minor children born as issued of this marriage. 
3. That Defendant is awarded visitation rights once a week 
for three hours at a mutually agreed upon place. 
4. The Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff $150.00 per 
child per month for a total of $300.00 per month as and for child 
support until said children reach the age of 18 years. 
5. Plaintiff is in need of support and Defendant is ordered 
to pay Plaintiff $150.00 per month as and for alimony until she 
remarries. 
6. The parties are awarded the personal property currently 
in his or her possession. 
7. Each party is ordered to pay and hold the other harmless 
for debts he or she has incurrd since their separation on 
February 3, 1984. 
8. Defendant is ordered to provide Plaintiff with an 
automobile in reasonable running condition. 
-2-
9. Plaintiff is awarded her costs incurred in this matter. 
DATED this / ^ day of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
-^Cdu> 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H, DIXON KINDLEY 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Decree of Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Elroy Taylor Barlow, Jr., Pro Se 
930 West 1700 South 
Salt Lake City,^tah 84102 
'"'" day otikll on this Jrh 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AM 
OR.'G.W'AL DOCUMEN£<Jto FILE IN THE THPf, 
DISTRICT COURTjjSAVJ/LAKE COUNTY, STAT2 Or 
UTAH 
DATE 
- 3 -
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S O C I A L S E R V I C E S 
-91 19 19 19 
anuary 
ebruary 
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pril 
«y 
une 
uly 
ugust 
eptember 
ctober 
overnber 
ecember 
^Cendant 
l§se_jf/ _ 
0 
218 
0 
55 
164 
0 
_0 
_0 
January 
February _ 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
ELROY TAYLOR BARLOW 
40091920R1, R2 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Li . ..fr Kathleen Barlow 1 Plamtit r 
Probation Date 
January 
Februar 
March 
April 
May 
i June 
July 
August 
Septemb 
October 
Novembe 
Decembe 
p 
y 
er 
r 
r 
Children 
Rocky - 02/02/80 
Nicholas - 09/23/_84 ._ 
•4 
..$3_00_s00 A r r e a r s ),26.<'£!j.1G 
Prepared by: W)$JJj ^Mf JsY\ /.TA , 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s /£~t^ day of ( L , 
> 
1992. 
-V -rvGiAsn^MUSsnn | 
l20fcn.-lh200WQSt4thFl.i 
San Lako City. Utah 84145 • 
My Commission Ejplroi I 
May 15.1004 | 
ADDENDUM E 
1 we discussed. I think the common scheme or plan or a much, 
2 much narrower kind of thing, as in State vs, Morrell and 
3 State vs. Shickles, in those sorts of cases that talk about it 
4 And we discussed that in the hall, and I think that I'd 
5 indicate that I think—I think that's what my position would 
6 be. 
7 THE COURT: That takes care of that. 
8 Now, do you have a motion to bring? 
9 MR. MAURO: Yeah. I have a motion for a mistrial 
10 to make, your Honor. I think the case that I have would be 
11 State vs. Troy, which talks about prosecutorial misconduct , 
12 and it sets out a two-pronged case. 
13 The first prong would be calling to the attention— 
14 calling to the attention of the jurors matters which would not 
15 be justified in considering—the juror would not be justified 
16 in considering in determining their verdict. And under the 
17 particular circumstances of the case, were the jurors probably 
18 influenced by. 
19 The first, clearly, in the prosecutorfs argument 
20 that he had had discussions with Mr. Barlow and his discussion 
21 that the State had known about these medical records and had 
22 through Mr. Hunt—number one, made Mr. Hunt the witness, number 
23 two, I think it's just clearly, clearly improper argument to 
24 make to a jury, your Honor, that he somehow becomes a witness, 
25 that he somehow has evidence and he's conveyed that to the 
I l£A 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801)286-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
1 jury without someone on the witness stand saying that. 
2 Number two, were they probably influenced? I think 
3 I think we need to look at what the jury's hearing. T h a t — 
4 that the State prosecutor has this evidence, that the State 
5 prosecutor has known about this evidence, and no other 
6 witness on the State prosecutor's team knows about this 
7 evidence, but that the State prosecutor, not once, but twice, 
8 both in direct closing argument and again on rebuttal, tells 
9 the jury that Mr. Barlow has had communications with hin 
10 regarding—regarding these medical bills and other matters. 
H I 'think that's, number one, clearly improper, 
22 number two, it's an improper way to get it into evidence. 
13 Mr. Hunt should become a witness in this case, if that is 
24 the case, and I think it would be inadmissible under the 
25 Rules of Evidence anyway, as some kind of a plea bargain; but 
16 y e t/ your Honor, were the jurors probably influenced? Well, 
17 certainly, I think they were. I think that's a logical 
28 conclusion that we can draw, in knowing that the State had 
29 this evidence. 
20 I'd submit it. 
2i THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 Any rebuttal to that, Mr. Hunt? 
23 MR. HUNT: Well, just very briefly, your Honor. 
24 The defendant is the one that testified, himself, about our 
conversations. I was very careful, especially after the 
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25 
1 Court's admonitions not to go into—although I don't think 
2 that any discussion of a civil settlement on this case would 
3 have been discussion of a plea bargain, as contemplated by the 
4 case law, I was still—be it as it may, I was still very 
5 careful not to bring up discussions of the civil settlement 
6 as well. 
7 And I stated no more than what Mr. Barlow testified 
8 to, and he himself opened that door. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. For the record, whether the 
10 Court feels that what Mr. Hunt argued was proper or improper, 
H it was Mr. Barlow v/ho testified himself, on the stand, that he 
12 had had discussions with Mr. Hunt at the office in regards to 
13 his inability to pay, if I remember the testimony correctly. 
24 I think that Mr. Hunt was cut off at a point that 
15 wasn't prejudicial to the defendant, and I think the Court 
16 also, in the course of the argument, gave the jury an oral 
17 question or instruction in the fact that what Mr. Hunt was 
18 saying was not testimony here today, he was not under oath, 
19 and in one instance, that they were to disregard what was said, 
20 The Court does not feel that what occurred arose to 
21 the threshold point of intentional or even inadvertentness 
22 or prosecutorial misconduct, and doesn't feel that a mistrial 
23 would be appropriate under these circumstances. 
24 All ricrht. But your objection and your motion is 
25 noted. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Richard P. Mauro, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and that 
four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to Attorneys for 
Appellee, Jeffrey Hunt and John K. West, Assistant Utah Attorney 
Generals, 120 North 200 West, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84110-1980, this & ^dav of October, 1992. 
6lCHARD P. MAURO 
DELIVERED by Patti Adamson this 9th day of October, 1992. 
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